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As beﬁts its title and heft, The Domain of Reasons is a magisterial
work.1 John Skorupski presents nothing less than a systematic account
of the normative realm as a whole, which he interprets in terms of rea-
sons to believe, to do, and to feel. Moreover, he situates his account
within an illuminating discussion of developments in thinking about
normativity from Kant’s ‘‘Critical turn’’ onward—connecting his view
dialectically not only with Kant, but with a series of important post-
Kantian thinkers, including Hegel, the Intuitionists, the Logical Positiv-
ists, and the later Carnap and Wittgenstein. In so doing Skorupski
makes a number of novel and important contributions to our under-
standing of these thinkers, and constructs a compelling philosophical
narrative that leads to his own view, the ‘‘Normative view’’, a form of
‘‘irrealist cognitivism’’.
Skorupski takes from Kant’s Critical project the idea of arguing
that: (i) however opposed they might seem, skepticism and traditional
responses to skepticism share certain assumptions; (ii) these assump-
tions are part of the problem, not of the solution, in systematic philos-
ophy; and (iii) they can and should be rejected—opening up the way
for new and more credible ways of thinking about reality and establish-
ing the possibility of knowledge and morality. The Domain of Reasons
does not shrink from any of these tasks.
The key defective assumption uniting skeptics and their adversaries,
in Skorupski’s view, is ‘‘global realism’’, the conjunction of two theses:
[i] factualism: to assert any proposition is to say that some fact
obtains,
[ii] cognition independence: facts are cognition independent. [7]
1 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
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Skorupski writes, ‘‘the Critical standpoint says that if we accept both
(i) and (ii) then no knowledge at all is possible’’ (7). Kant, Skorupski
believes, clearly rejects (ii) in treating the facts of the empirical world
as a ‘‘joint product of the forms of our sensibility and things in them-
selves’’ (10). This, however, leads to Kant’s two worlds and ‘‘transcen-
dental idealism’’—a metaphysical ‘‘stalemate’’, in Skorupski’s view
(13).
Instead, Skorupski argues, Kant should have seen that his account
of principles of pure reason would enable him to reject (i), since ‘‘that
there are requirements of reason is not made true by any fact’’ (11).
This involves rejecting a ‘‘correspondence’’ picture of truth, but not (ii)
or the idea of ‘‘substantial facts’’ that goes with it—it just means that
not all truths should be understood as holding ‘‘in virtue of’’ such
facts. Such a distinction is far from ad hoc, he claims, since the line
demarcating these two classes of truths follows a ‘‘fundamental episte-
mological and ontological distinction’’, between the normative and the
non-normative (29), which remains even after we have taken into
account thick concepts (97–98).
By retaining (ii), Skorupski reinstates within the Critical tradition
the possibility of ‘‘often knowable cognition-independent facts’’—
enabling us to appeal to such facts in giving the epistemology and
truth-conditions for descriptive propositions. For purely normative
propositions, including those in the epistemology of the factual, no
such appeal is possible—for them, inquiry is not to be understood in
terms of more or less reliable interaction with facts, nor is the
appearance ⁄ reality distinction to be explained in terms of ‘‘ﬁtting’’ or
‘‘not ﬁtting’’ the facts. Rather, a distinctive ‘‘epistemology of the
normative’’, of which more later, underwrites the difference between
genuine vs. merely apparent normativity (94). The upshot is an irrealism
or non-factualism about normative truths—strictly speaking, there are
no facts about what reasons someone has, or what reasons there are.
This might seem to be seriously revisionary, but for Skorupski, fac-
tualism and the correspondence theory are not really part of common
sense. Locutions like, ‘The fact that he had no reason to do it. . .’
involve only nominal, not substantive, factuality. By contrast, an impli-
cit grasp of the is ⁄ought distinction is part of our common sense, and
irrealism about the normative preserves this. In neither intuition nor
theory, Skorupski argues, do we have an intelligible picture of how
purely normative claims could represent any sort of fact—natural or
‘‘non-natural’’—for ‘‘no object of any kind can have intrinsic normativ-
ity’’ (451). This idea, that ‘‘normativity is not picturable’’, that ‘‘the idea
of a normative fact is inherently unintelligible’’, Skorupski ﬁnds also in
Wittgenstein’s ‘‘rule-following considerations’’ (451–52). And the ‘‘true
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importance’’ of these considerations—‘‘whether or not this was Witt-
genstein’s conclusion (whether or not he came to any conclusion)’’—is
that they ‘‘refute global realism’’ (446) by refuting factualism about the
purely normative, while leaving in place the possibility Skorupski
favors, factualism about the purely descriptive. (Here Skorupski appar-
ently rejects a global unraveling of factualism via the idea that meaning
is normative, though I am not sure I understand his view on this ques-
tion and so, apart from a brief comment at the end, will leave it aside.)
Still, a puzzle remains. If ‘‘reason relations’’—the basic form of
purely normative propositions—are unreal, no part either of the causal
order or of a ‘‘rational order’’ intuited by a quasi-perceptual form of
insight, how do we gain epistemic or semantic access to them? And
even if we reject the ‘‘truth-maker’’ picture for normative claims, don’t
we still need to understand under what conditions they are true?
One way of reducing puzzlement would be to adopt a form of non-
cognitivism, constructivism, or ﬁctionalism about normative claims, but
Skorupski rejects these possibilities. Non-cognitivism gets its appeal
from (i), which he has already found reason to reject, and from contro-
versial views about mind and language. And constructions and ﬁctions
exist only thanks to actual operations of human thought and invention,
whereas ‘‘What there is reason to believe, feel, or do is in no way
mind-dependent’’ (457).
Skorupski’s solution to the puzzle follows the ambitious Critical path
ﬁrst explored by Kant. Do not pronounce directly about truth and
existence, but ask instead about the very conditions for knowledge to be
possible. In so doing, Skorupski also follows Kant in distinguishing
between receptivity and spontaneity. The key example of receptivity is
sensation—sensory input arrives ‘‘from without’’, originating from
objects that owe nothing to our perception of them. Of course, raw
sensory input is not yet cognition—for that, on the Kantian view,
concepts must be applied, and this is the work of a diﬀerent kind of
faculty, understanding, ‘‘whose distinctive power is that of applying con-
cepts to the materials provided by sensibility’’ (12). But what guides this
power of judgment? A concept can be thought of as involving a rule, but
then, as Kant argued, to avoid regress judgment must operate other than
by following a rule itself. It must be a form of free but order-imposing
activity, a spontaneity, akin to autonomy in the practical sphere.
Skorupski seeks to demystify spontaneity, excising the Kantian idea
of freedom as ‘‘uncaused causation’’ and replacing it with the idea that
spontaneity is a ‘‘response or disposition. . .that comes in the right way
from, is genuinely that of, the actor’’ (406, emphasis added). This is not
a matter of being ‘‘uncaused’’, but of coming ‘‘from the actor’s nature’’
with no ‘‘alien’’ inﬂuence—as a disposition would if it were ‘‘accepted
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uncritically into one’s thinking from others’’ or the ill-considered result
of fatigue or spleen. A spontaneous response need not be ‘‘intuitive’’ or
‘‘innate’’ or arise ‘‘immediately’’ (406–07). Indeed, it can be the result
of prolonged reﬂection and discussion with others. Spontaneity thus
also contrasts with conventional or artiﬁcial, and is akin to what Witt-
genstein had in mind ‘‘when he invokes ‘natural ways of going on’’’ in
his discussion of rule-following (407). Although it is not easy to tell
whether a response on one’s part is genuinely spontaneous, this is, for
Skorupski, the question I must ask myself when I reﬂect upon any
matter—alone or with others—right down to the bottom: ‘‘Is that what
I really think?’’
What typically marks such a response as spontaneous is ‘‘a certain
experienced or felt normative harmony’’—not only does it seem to me
as if I really do think this way, but it also feels as though I have reason
to do so, even if I cannot articulate what this reason might be (407).
When this felt normative harmony breaks down, when, for example, I
am spontaneously disposed to accept someone’s testimony, but then
feel an unaccountable hesitancy in relying upon it—as if there were not
adequate reason to do so—then I am in a normative ﬁx. ‘‘Where there
is disharmony I’m not warranted in trusting to the spontaneity of my
responses’’ until I ﬁnd some way of achieving harmony or of explaining
the disharmony away (408–09).
Thus we see that Skorupski’s view concretely embodies the essential
Kantian link between self-determination and judgment. Indeed,
Skorupski goes further—all the way to metaphysics—speaking of the
‘‘indissoluble Critical tie between autonomy, knowledge, and cognitivist
irrealism about reasons’’ (23). Why is this so?
. . .if autonomy and knowledge are possible there must be norms
knowable a priori; if there are such norms, knowledge of them must
be a product not of receptivity but of pure spontaneity; if that is pos-
sible, norms cannot be factual propositions. [23]
What pure spontaneity can deliver by way of reasons is for Skorupski
much more expansive than Kant allowed, since Skorupski allows spon-
taneous feeling to enter self-determination alongside spontaneous belief
and will; it is equally an ‘‘epistemological basis’’ for normative
truths—in this case, for reasons to feel (27). In Skorupski’s view, Kant’s
failure to recognize the possibility of sui generis, irreducible reasons for
feeling—reasons to desire, admire, appreciate, be grateful, etc., which
Skorupski calls ‘‘evaluative reasons’’—led him to ‘‘distor[t] the content
of morality’’ (27) in ways long familiar to those who have criticized
Kant for his excessive formalism.
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Moreover, Skorupski takes as a starting point not full-blown Kan-
tian autonomy, but self-determination, guidance by what one takes to
be reasons, whether they are or not (388). Further, the process of tak-
ing something to be a reason carries us beyond pure self-scrutiny to
include the attempt to share reasons with others. In taking myself to
have a reason, I must, on Skorupski’s view, take myself to have a war-
rant other rational beings could in principle acknowledge. I might
begin with a clear sense that the parallels postulate is true and self-
evident, that I ‘‘understand why it must be so’’ (408). But when I
attempt to share my understanding with mathematicians, who point
out possibilities I had missed, I lose the ‘‘felt’’ normative assurance I
had in the postulate and its self-evidence (cf. 159). ‘‘Dialogic’’ conver-
gence of spontaneous responses among inquirers—based upon a com-
mitment to the universality of reasons rather than being brought
together by interacting with a realm of facts—lies at the basis of nor-
mative knowledge. ‘‘Self-evidence is a property only of norms’’ and
‘‘Normative propositions can be known through self-evidence because
their epistemic basis lies solely in spontaneity and convergence’’ (415).
It is difﬁcult to know whether one’s response in a given instance rep-
resents genuine spontaneity—even when a judgment ‘‘seems right’’ we
still need to submit our judgments to the perspectives and thoughts of
others, and the discipline of trying to make one’s views clear and
convincing to them. This is no threat to autonomy, no ‘‘transfer’’ of
epistemic self-determination to an ‘‘alien’’ source, because the authority
of others—the mathematicians, in my case—was itself ‘‘conferred’’ by
me on the strength of my sense of their greater credibility: ‘‘what we
freely accepted and trusted would still be the contribution we made’’
(388). My own, seemingly spontaneous dispositions are the inevitable
starting point of my normative thought. Were I to accord no default
epistemic authority to these ‘‘default’’ dispositions to trust my own eyes
or memory or thoughts, or to trust others, I would have nowhere to go
epistemically—no capacity for learning, no way to climb out of the
normative hole I would have dug for myself. But once these seemingly
spontaneous dispositions get learning underway, they also provide the
stuﬀ for self-scrutiny and shared scrutiny—defaults are defeasible and
revisable as we together seek reﬂective normative harmony.
Spontaneity in the practical sphere is ‘‘dialogical’’ as well. Skorupski
sides with Hegel, not Kant, in accepting the importance of Sittlichkeit
in understanding right and wrong, ‘‘We cannot construct morality
either from the purely individual standpoint of conscience or from that
of abstract theory’’ (389). At the same time, however, community stan-
dards are not in themselves determinative—if I defer to them, then,
absent coercion, that is my doing. I can criticize my community’s moral
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judgments immanently, as civil rights advocates did by holding white
citizens to a standard equality to which they gave lip service, or I can
adopt a more radical standpoint—after reﬂection and dialogue I might
simply ﬁnd self-evident on reﬂection a principle of justice deeply at
odds with common sense and practices: ‘‘Here I stand, I can do no
other.’’ As in theoretical reason, we must recognize this limiting case:
there would be nowhere for me to go normatively if I somehow with-
drew all authority from my own seemingly spontaneous dispositions to
believe or defer or feel or act. Whether my idiosyncratic stance will
turn out to be an example of moral ‘‘insight’’, or mere dogmatism on
my part, is for Skorupski a normative question—one which his meta-
theory of the normative leaves open. ‘‘Moral common sense can get it
wrong’’ (389).
What his meta-theory does say, however, is that, even though we
would frame this as a question of who is ‘‘getting it right or wrong’’,
there is no real fact about this—for we are in normative territory.
‘‘[S]ince moral wrongness is relative to warrant, the judgment of a
moral community might be right relative to its epistemic warrants, but
wrong relative to [mine]’’ (389).2
Here we ﬁnd the ‘‘crucial lack of parallelism between the epistemol-
ogy of factual judgments and the epistemology of reasons’’ (415).
Based on their experience, let us say, the Ancient Greeks converged
upon the idea that water is a basic substance, and had the warrant that
comes from harmony with their considered, reﬂective higher-order
views about what they have reason to believe. We moderns have con-
verged upon the idea that water is not a basic substance, and let us
suppose that we, too, have this sort of harmonious reﬂective justiﬁca-
tion. But, assuming away complexities of translation, Skorupski would
not have us say that they were ‘‘right relative to their warrants’’ while
we are ‘‘right relative to ours’’. There are substantial facts to be right
or wrong about, facts to which our claims are answerable, and which
aﬀord a robust, mind-independent notion of reliability for methods of
inquiry.
But in the case of normative beliefs, it seems, warrant is all there is,
and while spontaneous reﬂection and dialogic convergence can produce
higher and wider levels of warrant, there appears to be no place for the
idea of fully warranted but mistaken normative beliefs.
The process leading to [their] a priori warrant is. . .: spontaneous
normative dispositions, the search, where necessary[,] for reﬂective
normative harmony, and discussion with others with a view to
2 For a discussion of basic diﬀerences in spontaneous willing, see Jonas Olson’s
contribution to this symposium,
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checking for convergence. There is no other check on reliability
beyond these. [414]
In the case of the parallels postulate, by contrast, it was possible for an
entire community of inquirers—the Ancient Greeks, say—to ﬁnd a
proposition self-evident under normatively harmonious dialogic reﬂec-
tion, and still be wrong.
But now suppose that we humans are at ‘‘the end of inquiry’’, and
there is a fundamental principle of geometry or mathematics that spon-
taneously seems to our ﬁnest minds to be true, and self-evidently so,
after the most thorough dialogical discussion. Still, we humans have no
choice but to work with the particular spontaneous dispositions to
believe or ﬁnd credible we have, and these might be limited in various
ways. It seems coherent to imagine that possibilities beyond our cogni-
tive and imaginative limits show that this principle fails. But what
about normative propositions, including the proposition that this geo-
metric or mathematical claim is self-evident?
To think a proposition self-evident is to be spontaneously disposed to
judge it true just in virtue of understanding it. It is self-evident if that
judgement, made on that basis, perhaps through added reﬂection, is
warranted. [414]
At the end of inquiry, humans are wrong about the mathematical or
geometric principle, but, it seems, not about it being self-evident, or
certain, or rationally required. That seems to me an uncomfortable
result—weren’t we wrong both about the fact and about its epistemic
status? And given the tight connections between which principles of
mathematics, geometry, and logic hold true and which relations of
evidential support or inferential relevance obtain, won’t it in general be
difﬁcult to prise apart the possibility of ideally-justiﬁed error in former
case from the possibility of ideally-justiﬁed error in the latter? The two
would seem joined at the hip, even if each has its separate head. (Here,
too, is a place to insert the question of what the impact would be on
his realism-about-the-factual ⁄ irrealism-about-the-normative if meaning
is normative.)
Skorupski writes that, beyond the many arguments he makes,
. . .there is an underlying, stage-setting thought that I myself ﬁnd very
persuasive: ‘normativity’ can be nothing more than a way of talking
about that by which self-determining—reason-sensitive—agents steer.
It must come down to their reasons for belief, feeling, and action, to
the normative relation between facts, on the one hand, and those
reason-responsive actions or states, on the other. [5]
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This beautifully-crafted image leads naturally to the thought that the
facts are out there, while how we are to steer among the facts is not a
further fact—it must somehow come from us. That is the idea of ‘‘the
common source in spontaneity of all propositions about reasons’’ (23).
But does this support the conclusion that being the best-charted
course—the course ideal dialogical spontaneity would be disposed to
plot—is all there is to being the right course, to being fully ‘‘reason-
sensitive’’? Factual hazards to navigation can exist that outstrip our
capacity to know them—mightn’t there also be normative hazards of
this kind?
Skorupski discusses the intriguing case of Tom, ‘‘who is subject to a
psychological syndrome that makes him incapable of experiencing or
understanding feelings like gratitude. Can we,’’ Skoupski asks, ‘‘say
there is nonetheless reason for Tom to be grateful to Mary [for doing
him a good turn]. . .even though he can’t see it’’?3 (254) To sharpen this
doubt, he asks the reader to consider whether ‘‘there’s reason for the
cat not to torture the mouse, if only it could see it’’ (254).
A tough question! But I have no similar doubts about whether it is
a bad thing that the mouse is painfully tormented by the cat. And in a
similar way, I have no doubt that Tom is missing out on, failing to be
sensitive to, an important value in human relations—and that his life
and his relations with others would be better if he could come to feel
gratitude. Even if he can’t see this. Skorupski reminds us that not all
lives must follow the same ideals, it ‘‘depends, at least within limits, on
what matters to a person—what comes home to that person as worthy
of pursuit’’ (256). This is true, but what matters to a person (or a
mouse) can ‘‘come home to’’ him whether or not he, or anyone, can
acquire warranted belief about it or the reasons it gives. And if
Skorupski is right about ‘‘buck-passing’’ (82ﬀ), wherever there is value
or disvalue, there will be reasons.
It is typical of Skorupski’s thoroughness and depth that he provides
an extended discussion of questions about the possibility of errors in
the normative realm in the closing sections of The Domain of Reasons.
In the course of that discussion he broaches the question of ultimate
normative disagreement:
To defend a norm one must argue that those who disagree with it
have misunderstood it, or that their judgment is not genuinely sponta-
neous. . .or that their spontaneity is in some way faulty, as in the case
of gratitude-blind Tom. [499]
3 It is a separate question whether Tom could ‘‘have’’ this reason. On the important
distinction between there is a reason (say, to believe that p) and x has a reason (to
believe that p), see Quassim Cassam’s contribution to this symposium.
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My question is whether we mightn’t all, even under ideal normative
harmony and convergence, have faults like Tom’s—limits in our spon-
taneity that render us unable to grasp reasons that really are there, and
that could affect the quality of our lives or inquiries.
Certainly there exist reasons that I can’t grasp, and so my comment
here is meant as an invitation to the author to render clearer to me
how his irrealism about the normative handles such worries. My worry
is a version of the familiar worry about irrealism—that there can be
truths that go beyond our epistemic reach, even in an ideal limit. At
least, so long as that epistemology is not of the ‘‘whatever it takes’’
sort, but rather is grounded in something real, something within our
grasp—such as our spontaneous dispositions and dialogue with episte-
mic peers. Skorupski’s position is that this thought about truth exceed-
ing our reach makes perfect sense applied to objects inhabiting the
causal realm, but not when applied to reasons or values. I’m not sure
about this synthesis, or its stability.
Skorupski’s Domain of Reasons is a remarkable achievement, one of
the very few most powerful, systematic, and well-pondered books on
normativity to emerge in the 20 or so years since that topic has taken
center stage in philosophy. It breathes new life into the Critical project
initiated by Kant. We are fortunate indeed to have it.
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